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Prior to the health calamity that is the COVID-19 pandemic, many countries, 
including Canada and the United States, were experiencing lower-than-optimal 
uptake of immunization.1 This is despite the fact that immunization is recognized 
as one of the most effective means of controlling certain diseases and conditions, 
and as contributing to a range of other concomitant social, health, and economic 
benefits.2 Immunization rates can be undermined by a variety of personal cir-
cumstances (e.g., ignorance and lack of access to good information, poverty, ge-
ography, employments conditions, etc.), external influences (e.g., misinfor-
mation, disinformation, vaccine-negative social networks), and  structural 
barriers (e.g., dispersal of healthcare facilities, vaccine stock-outs, ineffective 
public health infrastructure, technical capacity, or practices and logistics). Im-
munization rates can be further eroded by unanticipated or unprepared-for dis-
ruptive events such as the outbreak of an infectious disease for which there is no 
vaccine (e.g., COVID-19).3 Indeed, such events can disrupt immunization strat-
egies and activities in a variety of ways that linger well after the emergency itself 
has been managed. This makes anticipating, planning for, assessing, and then 
learning from such events critically important. 
As of February 1, 2021, COVID-19 has resulted in some 102,399,513 rec-
orded or confirmed cases of COVID-19 worldwide, with 2,217,005 deaths,4 to 
 
 1 Ranee Seither et al., Vaccination Coverage Among Children in Kindergarten: United 
States, 2015‐16 School Year, 65 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY REP. 1057–64 (2016); Sarah 
Reagan‐Steiner et al., National, Regional, State, and Selected Local Area Vaccination Cover-
age Among Adolescents Aged 13‐17 Years: United States, 2015, 65 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY 
WKLY REP. 850-58 (2016); Flu Vaccination Coverage, United States, 2014‐15 Influenza Sea-
son, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (2016),  
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/fluvaxview/coverage‐1415estimates.htm; Joan Robinson, Potential 
Strategies to Improve Childhood Immunization Rates in Canada, 23 PAEDIATRICS & CHILD 
HEALTH 353–56 (2018). 
 2 See Vanessa Rémy et at., Vaccination: The Cornerstone of an Efficient Healthcare Sys-
tem, 3 J. MKT. ACCESS & HEALTH POL’Y 1 (2015); Vanessa Rémy et al., The Economic Value 
of Vaccination: Why Prevention is Wealth, 3 J. MKT. ACCESS & HEALTH POL’Y 1 (2015); Mark 
Doherty et al., Vaccine Impact: Benefits for Human Health, 34 VACCINE 6707–14 (2016); 
Jason Schwartz & Adel Mahmoud, When Not All That Counts Can be Counted: Economic 
Evaluations and the Value of Vaccination, 35 HEALTH AFFS. 208–11 (2016). 
 3 Amina Zafar, Putting Off Kids’ Vaccines During COVID-19 Heightens Risk of Other 
Outbreaks, CBC NEWS (Apr. 24, 2020), https://www.cbc.ca/news/health/covid-19-child-im-
munizations-1.5543286. 
 4 WHO Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard, WORLD HEALTH ORG. [WHO] 
(2021), https://covid19.who.int/. 
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which Canada contributed 778,972 cases and 20,032 deaths,5 and the World 
Health Organization (WHO) has emphasized the human and social costs behind 
these numbers.6 The global mortality rate for COVID-19 has placed intense pres-
sure on governments to fast-track vaccine development and approval,7 the ac-
cepted wisdom being that COVID-19 will only be controlled once safe and ef-
fective vaccines become widely available.8 Developing, testing, delivering and 
administering, and monitoring these vaccines, however, presents a range of chal-
lenges for which public health frameworks are not consistently well-equipped. 
Difficulties arise because: 
 
• different types of COVID-19 vaccines have been developed for use 
(i.e., killed, live attenuated, non-replicating adenovirus vector, pro-
tein subunit, replicating virus vector, mRNA and DNA);9 
• the vaccines have different mechanisms of action, and safety and ef-
ficacy profiles;10 
• supplies will be unevenly available;11 and 
• effective and equitable deployment of such large stocks create logis-




 5 Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19): Epidemiology Update, GOV’T CANADA (Feb. 
1, 2021), https://health-infobase.canada.ca/covid-19/epidemiological-summary-covid-19-
cases.html?stat=num&measure=deaths&map=pt#a2. 
 6 Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19): Situation Report 204, WORLD HEALTH ORG. 
[WHO] 1, 2 (2020),  https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/situation-re-
ports/20200811-covid-19-sitrep-204.pdf?sfvrsn=1f4383dd_2. 
 7 Barney S. Graham, Rapid COVID-19 Vaccine Development, 368 SCIENCE 945 (2020). 
 8 Marius Gilbert et al., Preparedness and Vulnerability of African Countries Against Im-
portations of COVID-19: A Modelling Study, 395 LANCET 871 (2020). 
 9 As of this writing, nine vaccines have been authorized for use. Jeff Craven, COVID-19 
Vaccine Tracker, REGULATORY FOCUS (Mar. 11, 2021),  https://www.raps.org/news-and-arti-
cles/news-articles/2020/3/covid-19-vaccine-tracker. The Pfizer-BioNtech Comirnaty 
BNT162b2 vaccine and the Moderna COVID-19 mRNA-1273 vaccine are approved in Can-
ada. Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Vaccines: Overview, GOV’T CANADA (Mar. 5, 2021),  
https://www.canada.ca/en/public-health/services/diseases/coronavirus-disease-covid-19/vac-
cines.html. 
 10 Jennifer A. Juno et al., Humoral and Circulating Follicular Helper T Cell Responses in 
Recovered Patients with COVID-19, NATURE MED. ONLINE (2020). 
 11 Katie Dangerfield, Canada’s ‘Slow’ Rollout of Coronavirus Vaccine ‘Embarrassing’: 
Experts, GLOBAL NEWS (Jan. 4, 2021), https://globalnews.ca/news/7553419/coronavirus-vac-
cine-canada-distribution-slow/; Rebecca Robbins, Frances Robles & Tim Arango, Here’s Why 
Distribution of the Vaccine Is Taking Longer Than Expected, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2021), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/31/health/vaccine-distribution-delays.html. 
 12 Melinda C. Mills & David Salisbury, The Challenges of Distributing COVID-19 Vac-
cinations, LANCET (Dec. 8, 2020). 
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These difficulties can give rise to equity and prioritization issues, delays, fail-
ures, etc., which could, in turn, undermine confidence in the vaccines and the 
systems through which they are administered, and in public health institutions 
and actors generally. This would compound the uncertainty, caution, and even 
recalcitrance that has already been instigated by the highly compressed develop-
ment and authorization processes of the COVID-19 vaccines;13 while the tradi-
tional timeline for new vaccine development is fifteen to twenty years, COVID-
19 vaccines have been developed and rolled out within a startling twelve to eight-
een months.14 
Given the above, the manner in which COVID-19 vaccines are authorized for 
use, and how well we can assess how they are performing will influence how 
both these vaccines and other (routine) vaccines are received by the public mov-
ing forward, our practices and processes can either encourage or undermine 
COVID-19 vaccine acceptance, and vaccine acceptance more generally in the 
longer term.15 At The Future of Global Healthcare Governance conference, we 
were invited to consider how—in pursuit of the ‘collective good’ that is neces-
sary in response to the pandemic—governments and law might positively influ-
ence vaccine confidence and acceptance.16 In this paper, we examine how law is 
serving as a possible barrier to COVID-19 and post-COVID-19 immunization 
goals, with an emphasis on the Canadian situation, which is generally compara-
ble to other high-income countries with similar regulatory systems.17 
 
 13 Angela Jung, New Survey Finds More Canadians are Hesitant About Getting a Vaccine 
Against COVID-19, British Columbia, CTV NEWS (Oct. 2, 2020), https://bc.ctvnews.ca/new-
survey-finds-more-canadians-are-hesitant-about-getting-a-vaccine-against-covid-19-
1.5131271; Tara Azimi et al., COVID-19 Vaccines Meet 100 Million Uncertain Americans, 
MCKINSEY & CO. (Dec. 18, 2020), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/pharmaceuticals-
and-medical-products/our-insights/covid-19-vaccines-meet-100-million-uncertain-ameri-
cans#; Doubts About Vaccines in General and the Speed of Making the COVID-19 Vaccines 
Have Some Taking a Cautious View, NORTON HEALTHCARE (Dec. 22, 2020),  https://norton-
healthcare.com/news/reaching-those-skeptical-about-covid-19-vaccines/. See also COVID-19 
Vaccine Deployment: Behaviour, Ethics, Misinformation and Policy Strategies, ROYAL SOC’Y 
(Oct. 21, 2020), https://royalsociety.org/-/media/policy/projects/set-c/set-c-vaccine-deploy-
ment.pdf?la=en-GB&hash=43073E5429C87FD2674201CA19280A8E. 
 14 Nicole Lurie et al., Developing Covid-19 Vaccines at Pandemic Speed, 382 NEW ENG. 
J. MED. 1969 (2020); Penny Heaton, The Covid-19 Development Multiverse, 383 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 1986 (2020). 
 15 In this regard, we note that the aim of “immunizations throughout the life-course,” de-
mands much greater attention to program integration and rationalization, and to adult immun-
ization, a matter which the eventual immunization against COVID-19 will foreground. Im-
munization Agenda 2030: A Global Strategy to Leave No One Behind, WORLD HEALTH ORG. 
[WHO] 25 (Apr. 1, 2020). 
 16 University of Georgia School of Law Dean Rusk International Law Center and Georgia 
Journal of International and Comparative Law Conference: The Future of Global Health Gov-
ernance (Jan. 25, 2021), http://www.law.uga.edu/gjiclspring2021. 
 17 This paper is an outcome of the Trust, Acceptance and Sufficiency: Law as a Barrier 
to, and Enabler of, Routine and Responsive Immunization, Including COVID-19 project, 
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Specifically, we examine elements of the Canadian vaccine development and 
safety ecosystem, contending that the subject elements are characterized by 
shortcomings that combine to undermine trust in the system and the vaccines it 
makes available. 
We begin by briefly outlining the vaccine development and safety ecosystem 
in Canada, identifying its key stages and mechanisms. We then explore in more 
detail two elements of that ecosystem. First, we examine the market authoriza-
tion stage, focusing on how it was used in response to COVID-19. We argue that 
the manner in which it has functioned, both generally and throughout the 
COVID-19 pandemic, exhibits a systemic operational weakness, being a lack of 
sufficient and appropriate transparency. Second, we explore the post-deployment 
or clinical surveillance stage, arguing that its mechanisms aimed at identifying 
and reporting ‘adverse events following immunization’ (AEFIs) are character-
ized by an improper absence of standards, signifying design shortcomings. These 
shortcomings have been accentuated by the COVID-19 pandemic, and could, in 
turn, undermine actions taken in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. 
As a preliminary matter, we note that we accept the WHO definition of an 
AEFI as “any untoward medical occurrence which follows immunization and 
which does not necessarily have a causal relationship with the usage of the vac-
cine.”18 Common non-serious AEFIs include redness and swelling at the injec-
tion site or mild fever.19 These will often be detected in the clinical trials, and 
they do not preclude vaccine approval so long as they are not excessively expe-
rienced. As such, they are not the sort of AEFIs that health authorities are inter-
ested in capturing; they are merely a mild and expected consequence of taking a 
compound designed to stimulate the immune system, and they should be ad-
dressed as a routine part of the usual consent and administering process. It is the 
serious AEFIs that the surveillance system is interested in capturing, for these 
have important consequences for the safety and efficacy profile of the vaccine, 
which in turn have potential implications for recommendations about routine use 
issued by national immunization advisory authorities, as well as the acceptance 
of the vaccine by the public. 
We close by offering some recommendations on what governments can do to 
ensure that these stages of the vaccine development and safety ecosystem are 
more effectively working in pursuit of the collective good. 
 
 
which was funded in part by the Public Health Agency of Canada and the Canadian Institutes 
of Health Research, and received ethics approval by the IWK Health Centre Research Ethics 
Board on October 29, 2020. 
 18 REPORT OF CIOMS/WHO WORKING GROUP ON VACCINE PHARMACOVIGILANCE, 
DEFINITION AND APPLICATION OF TERMS FOR VACCINE PHARMACOVIGILANCE 39 (2012). 
 19 Id. 
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II. THE CANADIAN VACCINE DEVELOPMENT AND SAFETY 
ECOSYSTEM 
 
In this section, we briefly describe the major components of what we consider 
to be the Canadian ‘vaccine development and safety ecosystem.’ This is the col-
lection of post-innovation regulatory architectures and practices that is com-
prised of the pre-clinical stage, the market authorization stage, the routine use 
assessment stage, and the clinical surveillance stage of vaccine development, as-
sessment, deployment, and reassessment. 
Once a vaccine compound has been theorized and prepared, its further devel-
opment and testing begins in the pre-clinical stage, where vaccines, like other 
therapeutic products, are expected to undergo laboratory-based safety and effi-
cacy evaluations in animals and in humans. Phase I trials in humans involve 20-
100 volunteers and focus on detecting serious side effects. Phase II trials gener-
ally involve hundreds of volunteers, and they are meant to determine the best 
dose and number of doses for effectiveness and safety. Phase III trials involve 
several thousand volunteers and undertake comparisons with placebos or al-
ready-licensed vaccines.20 It is the responsibility of the vaccine sponsor/manu-
facturer to ethically generate at least threshold data that demonstrates that the 
proposed vaccine is safe and effective, after which it applies for a license from 
Health Canada’s Biological and Radiopharmaceutical Drugs Directorate 
(BRDD).21 
The pre-clinical stage is followed by the licensing stage, which gatekeeps mar-
ket access. In keeping with other major frameworks in high-income countries 
and intergovernmental organizations (e.g., the European Union, Japan, the 
United Kingdom, the United States), Health Canada is responsible, under the 
Food and Drugs Act (FDA),22 and the related Food and Drug Regulations 
(FDR),23 for assessing therapeutic products. The law grants the Minister and his 
or her designees extensive powers, including those of inspection, the ordering of 
production, the seizure of material, and, ultimately, the issuing of licenses to im-
port, manufacture, and sell therapeutic products in Canada.24 It also requires 
 
 20 Glossary of Common Terms, NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH (NIH), https://www.nih.gov/health-
information/nih-clinical-research-trials-you/glossary-common-terms (accessed June 14, 
2021). 
 21 Biologic and Radiopharmaceutical Drugs Directorate, GOV’T CANADA,  
https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/corporate/about-health-canada/branches-agen-
cies/health-products-food-branch/biologics-genetic-therapies-directorate.html#wb-cont (last 
updated Oct. 20, 2020). 
 22 R.S.C. 1985, c F-27, s. 21 (Can.). 
 23 Food & Drug Regulations, C.R.C., c 870 (Can.). 
 24 Food & Drug Act, R.S.C. 1985, c F-27, ss 22–30 (Can.). 
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sponsors or manufacturers to provide scientific evidence of the product’s quality, 
safety, and efficacy.25 
With respect to new drug submissions (NDS) for Schedule D drugs (biologic 
drugs for humans), the Centre for Biologics Evaluation (CBE), part of the 
BRDD, evaluates the research protocol, the conduct of the clinical trials and their 
data, the manufacturing protocols, and the purity and potency testing that has 
been undertaken.26 In doing so, it tests and analyzes the products and conducts a 
risk-benefit analysis, taking into consideration internationally agreed-upon 
standards for good laboratory practices, good manufacturing practices, good 
clinical practices, etc.27 It is also empowered to conduct on-site evaluations 
(OSE), which are product-specific assessments of the quality (chemistry and 
manufacturing) component of a drug submission to confirm the ability of the 
manufacturer to consistently produce a safe biologic drug.28 If the evidence sup-
ports the submitter’s quality, safety, and efficacy claims, and the benefits of the 
product outweigh the risks, Health Canada will issue a Notice of Compliance 
(NOC) and a Drug Identification Number (DIN), and the product can be sold in 
Canada through the Lot Release Program.29 
Post-approval, the National Advisory Committee on Immunization (NACI) 
determines whether the product will be recommended for routine use in Can-
ada.30 This is a formal review conducted by independent experts in infectious 
 
 25 Food & Drug Regulations, C.R.C. c 870 (Can.), Div. 8. Division 5 deals with the import 
or sale of drugs for purposes of conducting clinical trials, addressing such issues as serious 
unexpected adverse reactions and the suspension or cancellation of trials. Food & Drug Reg-
ulations, C.R.C. c 870 (Can.), Div. 5. 
 26 Biologic and Radiopharmaceutical Drugs Directorate, GOV’T CANADA (Oct. 20, 2020), 
https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/corporate/about-health-canada/branches-agen-
cies/health-products-food-branch/biologic-radiopharmaceutical-drugs-directorate.html. 
 27 Guidance Document Non-Clinical Laboratory Study Data Supporting Drug Product 




For more on these, see INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON HARMONISATION, 
http://www.ich.org/home.html (last visited June 9, 2021). 
 28 See Biologic and Radiopharmaceutical Drugs Directorate, GOV’T CANADA,  
https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/corporate/about-health-canada/branches-agen-
cies/health-products-food-branch/biologics-genetic-therapies-directorate.html#wb-cont (last 
updated Oct. 20, 2020); Regulatory Roadmap for Biologic (Schedule D) Drugs in Canada, 
GOV’T CANADA, https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/services/drugs-health-products/bio-
logics-radiopharmaceuticals-genetic-therapies/regulatory-roadmap-for-biologic-
drugs.html#wb-cont (last updated Feb. 19, 2021). 
 29 GOV’T CANADA, supra note 26. 
 30 National Advisory Committee on Immunization (NACI): Membership and Representa-
tion, GOV’T CANADA (Mar. 17, 2021), https://www.canada.ca/en/public-health/services/im-
munization/national-advisory-committee-on-immunization-naci/naci-membership-represen-
tation.html. 
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diseases, public health, vaccine safety, epidemiology, paediatrics, nursing, and 
internal medicine. NACI reviews the safety and efficacy data on both new and 
existing vaccines on an ongoing basis. As new efficacy and safety data are re-
ported post-licensure, recommendations are updated. NACI members are pre-
cluded from making recommendations for any vaccine if they have a conflict of 
interest.31 
The last element of the vaccine development and safety ecosystem is clinical 
surveillance, or ‘pharmacovigilance.’ This is about the detection, assessment, 
understanding, prevention, and communication of AEFIs and ‘vaccine fail-
ures,’32 or any other vaccine- or immunization-related issues. Pre-clinical trials 
are not usually large enough to detect rare (>0.01% and < 0.1%) and very rare (< 
0.01%) AEFIs, nor those where onset is much delayed.33 These are only detected 
when very large numbers of people have been immunized (i.e., after the vaccine 
has been approved for use and deployed widely). Under the Food and Drug Reg-
ulations, responsibilities are imposed on vaccine manufacturers (or market au-
thorization holders) regarding post-market safety monitoring, reporting, and, in 
some cases, specific safety studies,34 and they are expected to submit safety up-
date reports that contain all global data related to the use of their product. 
In the following sections, we argue that the Canadian vaccine development 
and safety ecosystem, like similar systems in other jurisdictions, is either oper-
ating or is designed, depending on the issue, sub-optimally. While a number of 
elements could be examined to demonstrate this claim, we focus on insufficient 
transparency in the market authorization stage (being an operational shortcom-
ing), and insufficiently clear and harmonized standards in the clinical surveil-
lance stage (being a design shortcoming). Combined, these shortcomings serve 
 
 31 Shalini Desai et al., Canada’s National Advisory Committee on Immunization: Cele-
brating 50 Years, CAN. J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES & MED. MICROBIOLOGY 126 (May–June 
2015). 
 32 A vaccine failure is confirmed when the target disease is detected in individuals vac-
cinated for that disease. A vaccine failure would typically constitute an AEFI. With respect to 
COVID-19, identifying vaccine failures requires a systematized way of tracking that a person 
who is testing positive for COVID-19 has previously been vaccinated against COVID-19. 
Making such a determination is difficult if there exists no central data system that healthcare 
workers can access to identify a patient’s immuno-status, as is the case in Canada. 
 33 CIOMS/WHO WORKING GROUP ON VACCINE PHARMACOVIGILANCE, supra note 18. 
 34 Vaccine Safety Basics Learning Manual, WORLD HEALTH ORG. [WHO] 28 (2013), 
https://www.who.int/vaccine_safety/initiative/tech_support/Vaccine-safety-E-course-man-
ual.pdf (“[V]accines may undergo clinical trials after licensure to assess the effects of changes 
in vaccine formulation, vaccine strain, age at vaccination, number and timing of vaccine doses, 
simultaneous administration and interchangeability of vaccines from different manufacturers 
on vaccine safety and immunogenicity . . . .”); see also id. (further explaining that “to improve 
detection of AEFIs that are not detected during pre-licensure trials, some vaccines have un-
dergone formal Phase IV Surveillance Studies with cohorts as large as 100,000 and durations 
of 4–6 years.”). 
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to undermine trust in the system, its actors, and its outcomes, and thereby con-
tribute to vaccine hesitancy,35 and to COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy in particular. 
 
III. THE MARKET AUTHORIZATION STAGE: INSUFFICIENT 
TRANSPARENCY AND PERCEPTIONS OF SAFETY 
 
To begin, transparency has not been a hallmark of therapeutic product market 
approval processes in Canada. Prior to the modernization of the therapeutic prod-
ucts regulatory system through the adoption of the Protecting Canadians from 
Unsafe Drugs Act (Vanessa’s Law),36 Health Canada had been subject to re-
peated and scathing criticisms in relation to its information use and disclosure,  
its perceived culture of secrecy, and its regulatory capture by the pharmaceutical 
industry.37 Vanessa’s Law had the dual objectives of providing a modern plat-
form upon which to support an emergent biotechnology sector and improving 
confidence in the oversight of therapeutic products by strengthening safety over-
sight, improving reporting of serious adverse drug reactions by certain health 
 
 35 Martin Letendre, The Montreal Tuberculosis Outbreak Revisited, VERITAS IRB (Apr. 
11, 2016), https://researchethicssimplified.com/the-montreal-tuberculosis-outbreak-revis-
ited/; Emilie Karafillakis et al., HPV Vaccination in a Context of Public Mistrust and Uncer-
tainty: A Systematic Literature Review of Determinants of HPV Vaccine Hesitancy in Europe, 
15 HUM. VACCINES & IMMUNOTHERAPEUTICS 1615 (2019). 
 36 S.C. 2014, c 24 (Can.) (amending the FDA and FDR). 
 37 Matthew Herder, Unlocking Health Canada’s Cache of Trade Secrets: Mandatory Dis-
closure of Clinical Trial Results, 184 CANADIAN MED. ASS’N J. 194 (2012); Andrew Prayle et 
al., Compliance with Mandatory Reporting of Clinical Trial Results on ClinicalTrials.gov: 
Cross-sectional Study, 344 BMJ d7373 (2012); Joel Lexchin, Health Canada and the Phar-
maceutical Industry: A Preliminary Analysis of the Historical Relationship, 9 HEALTHCARE 
POL’Y 22 (2013); Matthew Herder, A New Bill Will Make Health Canada’s Drug Approvals 
More Transparent. In Theory, Anyway, NAT’L POST (Nov. 5, 2014), https://national-
post.com/opinion/matthew-herder-a-new-bill-will-make-health-canadas-drug-approvals-
more-transparent-in-theory-anyway; Matthew Herder, Denaturalizing Transparency in Drug 
Regulation, 8 MCGILL J. L. & HEALTH S57 (2015); Joel Lexchin, Private Profits vs. Public 
Policy: The Pharmaceutical Industry and the Canadian State, U. TORONTO PRESS (2016). 
With respect to the opacity around decisions relating to COVID-19 vaccines, see Cormac 
MacSweeney, Trudeau Government Silent on Drug Manufacturer Liability for COVID-19 
Vaccines, CITYNEWS (Dec. 8, 2020), https://www.citynews1130.com/2020/12/08/trudeau-
government-liability-covid-19-vaccines/. See also Sandra J. Bean, Emerging and Continuing 
Trends in Vaccine Opposition Website Content, 29 VACCINE 1874 (2011); David Broniatowski 
et al., Weaponized Health Communication: Twitter Bots and Russian Trolls Amplify the Vac-
cine Debate, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1378 (2018); John D. Lee, The Utter Familiarity of Even 
the Strangest Vaccine Conspiracy Theories, ATLANTIC (Jan. 11, 2021), https://www.theatlan-
tic.com/ideas/archive/2021/01/familiarity-strangest-vaccine-conspiracy-theories/617572/. 
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care institutions, and increasing transparency.38 It enabled Health Canada, for the 
first time, to: 
 
• compel further testing on products, including when issues arise with 
at-risk populations; 
• require label and package changes when serious risks are identified; 
• recall unsafe products; and 
• impose tougher penalties for unsafe products. 
 
However, by 2017, Health Canada had not yet exercised its new authority de-
spite cases where it might have justifiably done so,39 and it was not until Decem-
ber 2019 that it had adopted regulations, through which much of the amendments 
work.40 
The pre-existing frustration over Health Canada’s lack of transparency has 
been compounded by the pandemic, during which therapeutic products (includ-
ing vaccines) have entered the pre-clinical and market authorization stages, and 
in some cases clinical use, with little reliable information furnished to the pub-
lic,41 or indeed little reliable information at all.42 With respect to COVID-19 re-
lated clinical trials, the following has been observed: 
[T]rials are being rapidly authorized and misinformation about 
merits of various experimental interventions is prevalent. Delay-
ing disclosure of clinical trial designs, correspondence between 
regulators and sponsors about those designs, and the basis for cru-
cial decisions to be made by [data safety monitoring boards] 
about whether to halt or modify a trial at the point of interim anal-
ysis until after the decision to authorize or approve the 
 
 38 Katherine Fierlbeck, Reforming the Regulation of Therapeutic Products in Canada: 
The Protecting of Canadians from Unsafe Drugs Act (Vanessa’s Law), 4 HEALTH REFORM 
OBSERVER, ART. 5 (2016). 
 39 Adrienne Schnier, The Protecting Canadians from Unsafe Drugs Act: What is Happen-
ing with Vanessa’s Law?, 90 OBITER DICTA 9 (2017). 
 40 Id. 
 41 For example, while Health Canada discloses a fairly significant amount of information 
through its Clinical Information Portal, launched in March 2019, much of the safety and effi-
cacy data is disclosed post-approval, and that data is comprised primarily of the Clinical Study 
Reports, not the agency review itself (other than a high-level summary of decisions taken). 
Sterling Edmonds et al., Transparency Too Little, Too Late? Why and How Health Canada 
Should Make Clinical Data and Regulatory Decision-Making Open to Scrutiny in the Face of 
COVID-19, 19 J. L. & BIOSCIENCES 7 (2020), https://academic.oup.com/jlb/arti-
cle/7/1/lsaa083/5991911. 
 42 Id. Health Canada authorized remdesivir, a COVID-19-targeting drug, on the basis of 
study protocols and preliminary or topline results; the CSRs that normally accompany an NDS 
were not provided. 
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intervention pre-empts the correction of potential flaws in trial 
designs and limits the opportunity to build public understanding 
of the knowledge and uncertainties behind a given COVID-19 in-
tervention.43 
Lack of transparency around the relationship that exists between regulators 
and regulatees, the evidence that is generated during vaccine development and 
testing, and the evidence relied on to grant market access is a particularly perni-
cious problem in the vaccine setting because vaccine acceptance is persistently 
hampered by concerns around insufficient evidence, secrecy, and government-
pharma ‘coziness’ and conspiracies.44 
In the market authorization stage, Health Canada bases its level or intensity of 
regulatory oversight—testing or protocol review and compliance monitoring—
on the degree of risk felt to be associated with the product.45 Neither the reasons 
for this variability of scrutiny, nor indications as to when it is in play and what 
standard is being applied, are well communicated to the public, nor are the other 
market access flexibilities.46 The most opaque flexibility—discretionary use of 
 
 43 Id. 
 44 A search in CanLII using the terms “vaccine” and “vaccination” and “conspiracy” turns 
up fifty-seven court cases. A common scenario is that estranged parents are in conflict over 
the immunization of the children of the marriage, and the vaccine-refusing parent introduces 
into evidence opinions about government-pharma conspiracies. See, e.g.,  A.P. v. L.K., [2021] 
ONSC 150 (2021). 
 45 Regulatory Roadmap for Biologic (Schedule D) Drugs in Canada, GOV’T CANADA 
(July 2020), https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/services/drugs-health-products/biolog-
ics-radiopharmaceuticals-genetic-therapies/regulatory-roadmap-for-biologic-drugs.html#wb-
cont; Compliance and Enforcement Policy for Health Products (POL-0001), HEALTH CANADA 
(Dec. 2018),  https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/services/drugs-health-products/com-
pliance-enforcement/good-manufacturing-practices/policies-standards/compliance-enforce-
ment-health-products.html. 
 46 Presently, the Canadian regulatory framework contains two regular accelerated path-
ways for drug approval and access. The first is the Extraordinary Use New Drugs (EUND), 
which allows the authorization of drugs based on non-clinical information and limited clinical 
information, and which is available in circumstances where sponsors cannot reasonably pro-
vide substantial evidence to demonstrate the safety and efficacy of a new drug in humans due 
to logistical or ethical challenges in conducting the appropriate human clinical trials. While 
extensive data from clinical trials is absent, there are requirements for rigorous post-marketing 
surveillance. The second is the Special Access Program (SAP), which is open to seriously-ill 
patients for whom conventional therapies have failed, are unsuitable, or are unavailable. Sup-
ported by ss C.08.010 and C.08.011 of the Food and Drug Regulations, it is triggered by a 
healthcare professional request, and it authorizes a manufacturer to sell a drug that cannot 
otherwise be sold or distributed in Canada. The antiviral remdesivir was accessed under the 
SAP up to July 27, 2020, after which it was approved by Health Canada, subject to conditions 
that the company provide data from the trials conducted to date as well as periodic safety 
reports. Remdesivir Authorized with Conditions for the Treatment of Patients in Canada with 
Severe COVID-19 Symptoms, HEALTH CANADA (July 28, 2020), 
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Interim Orders—was adopted in relation to the approval process for the COVID-
19 vaccines. The Minister exercised the discretion to make Interim Orders con-
taining any provision that may be contained in a regulation made under the Act 
if the Minister believes that immediate action is required to deal with a signifi-
cant risk, direct or indirect, to health, safety, or the environment.47 
On May 23, 2020, the Minister issued an Interim Order Respecting Clinical 
Trials for Medical Devices and Drugs Relating to COVID-19 (2020),48 which 
reduced administrative requirements when assessing the use of existing marketed 
products as possible COVID-19-related therapies; permitted alternate means of 
obtaining patient consent; broadened the criteria for qualified health profession-
als who can carry out qualified investigator duties at remote sites; and expanded 
the range of applicants able to apply for medical device clinical trial authoriza-
tions. Health Canada emphasized that it remained committed to prioritizing the 
review of all COVID-19 clinical trial applications within fourteen days, both 
through the usual pathway and this alternative regulatory pathway.49 
On September 16, 2020, the Minister issued an Interim Order Respecting the 
Importation, Sale and Advertising of Drugs for Use in Relation to COVID-19 
(2020),50 which created an expedited pathway to market approval for drugs and 
vaccines aimed at COVID-19.51 Health Canada stated that its “objective was to 
expedite the authorization for the importation, sale, and advertising of drugs used 
 
https://healthycanadians.gc.ca/recall-alert-rappel-avis/hc-sc/2020/73621a-eng.php. For more 
on these accelerated pathways, see Guidance Document: Submission and Information Re-
quirements for Extraordinary Use New Drugs (EUNDs), GOV’T CANADA (May 16, 2014), 
https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/hc-sc/migration/hc-sc/dhp-mps/alt_for-
mats/pdf/brgtherap/applic-demande/guides/eund-dnue-eng.pdf; Health Canada’s Special Ac-
cess Program: Request a Drug, GOV’T CANADA, https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/ser-
vices/drugs-health-products/special-access/drugs.html. 
 47 Food & Drugs Act, R.S.C. 1985, c F-27 at 30.1(1). In addition, the Governor-in-Council 
can make regulations that it considers necessary for the purpose of preventing shortages of 
therapeutic products in Canada, or for alleviating those shortages or their effects, in order to 
protect human health. Food & Drugs Act, R.S.C. 1985, c F-27 at 30(1.4) (repealed 2020). 
 48 See MINISTER OF HEALTH, INTERIM ORDER RESPECTING CLINICAL TRIALS FOR MEDICAL 
DEVICES AND DRUGS RELATING TO COVID-19 (2020), https://www.canada.ca/en/health-can-
ada/services/drugs-health-products/covid19-industry/interim-order-respecting-clinical-trials-
medical-devices-drugs.html. 
 49 Interim Order Respecting Clinical Trials for Medical Devices and Drugs Relating to 
COVID-19: Notice, GOV’T CANADA (May 27, 2020), https://www.canada.ca/en/health-can-
ada/services/drugs-health-products/covid19-industry/interim-order-respecting-clinical-trials-
medical-devices-drugs/notice-interim-order.html#wb-cont. 
 50 MINISTER OF HEALTH, INTERIM ORDER RESPECTING THE IMPORTATION, SALE AND 
ADVERTISING OF DRUGS FOR USE IN RELATION TO COVID-19 (2020), https://www.can-
ada.ca/en/health-canada/services/drugs-health-products/covid19-industry/drugs-vaccines-
treatments/interim-order-import-sale-advertising-drugs.html. 
 51 Drugs and Vaccines for COVID-19: Overview, GOV’T CANADA (Sept. 13, 2020), 
https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/services/drugs-health-products/covid19-indus-
try/drugs-vaccines-treatments/authorization.html. 
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in relation to COVID-19 and establishment licensing, while taking into consid-
eration urgent public health needs[.]”52 It went on to state that market authoriza-
tion will be: 
predicated on the Minister’s determination that the evidence pro-
vided supports the conclusion that the benefits outweigh the risks 
associated with the drug, taking into account the uncertainties re-
lated to the benefits and risks, as well as the urgent public health 
need caused by COVID-19. This includes weighing the risks of 
modifying certain requirements for information to support the 
safety and effectiveness of a drug, such as allowing consideration 
of a foreign regulatory approval, against the benefits of having it 
available to Canadians quickly.53 
Ultimately, the Interim Order introduced three mechanisms for Health Canada 
to expedite the availability of COVID-19 drugs in Canada: 
 
• Reduced Data: Authorizing a drug, including those not yet licensed 
in Canada or other jurisdictions, based on a modified set of applica-
tion requirements (with the potential for a “rolling” submission of in-
formation as it becomes available); 
• Foreign Approval: Authorizing a drug included on The List of For-
eign Drugs based on certain elements being approved by a trusted 
foreign regulatory authority (e.g., Europe’s European Medicines 
Agency, or regulators from Australia, Japan, Singapore, Switzerland, 
the United Kingdom and the United States) where they have been 
shown to provide some benefit in the context of COVID-19; 
• Expanded Indications: Expanding the indication for an already ap-
proved drug to include a COVID-19 indication based on known evi-
dence, with or without an application from the market authorization 
holder (i.e., an expanded age group or population compared to that in 
the existing NOC).54 
 
The Interim Order also introduces a mechanism whereby drugs that show 
promise for treating or preventing COVID-19 can be imported and “pre-posi-
tioned” or placed in Canadian facilities before their authorization to allow for 
 
 52 Explanatory Note: Interim Order Respecting the Importation, Sale and Advertising of 
Drugs for Use in Relation to COVID-19, GOV’T CANADA, https://www.canada.ca/en/health-
canada/services/drugs-health-products/covid19-industry/drugs-vaccines-treatments/interim-
order-import-sale-advertising-drugs/note.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2021). 
 53 Id. 
 54 MINISTER OF HEALTH, supra note 50. 
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quicker distribution after authorization.55 The use of pre-positioning is restricted 
to promising COVID-19 drugs for which the Government of Canada has entered 
into a Procurement Agreement with the manufacturer.56 When proceeding under 
the Interim Order, applications are not subject to the fees that apply when oper-
ating under the regular regime.57 The Interim Order is only valid for a one-year 
term and product authorizations issued under it are only valid while the Interim 
Order is in effect, but Health Canada is developing transition measures to avoid 
disruptions when the Interim Order ends.58 
The COVID-19 response has accentuated the pre-existing concerns around 
transparency insofar as it has eased standards around both clinical trials and reg-
ulatory approval for importing and selling without clearly indicating how this 
has happened and what its potential consequences are. A lack of transparency 
around clinical trial data poses potentially significant risks to trial participants 
and patients, it jeopardizes clinical trial quality, and it could undermine trust in 
key actors and thereby contribute to vaccine hesitancy. This easing of standards 
must be understood against a background of demonstrated reporting bias in rela-
tion to trial outcomes,59 and a general reluctance on the part of key actors to 
release relevant data in a timely fashion.60 Ultimately, the scrutiny to which vac-
cine candidates are subject varies, and the effective functioning of the safety sys-
tem has been criticized on this point.61 On this point, it has been argued that, to 
begin with, decisions have been made on less-than-ideal amounts of data: 
In the context of the current pandemic . . . Health Canada has 
shown a willingness to accept data on a piecemeal basis and even 
approved one drug (remdesivir) without the benefit of CSRs 
[Clinical Study Reports]. Until those CSRs are submitted to 
Health Canada little to no information about remdesivir’s safety 
and efficacy is likely to be published via the [Clinical 
 
 55 Alice Tseng & Nancy Pei, New Interim Order for COVID-19 Drugs Has Wide-reaching 
Impact, Allowing Minister to Unilaterally Expand Indication for Non-COVID-19 Drugs, 
SMART & BIGGAR (Sept. 29, 2020), https://www.smartbiggar.ca/insights/publication/new-in-
terim-order-for-covid-19-drugs-has-wide-reaching-impact-allowing-minister-to-unilaterally-
expand-indication-for-non-covid-19-drugs. 
 56 MINISTER OF HEALTH, supra note 50, s 27(c). 
 57 Tseng & Pei, supra note 55. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Natalie McGauran et al., Reporting Bias in Medical Research: A Narrative Review, 11 
TRIALS 1–15 (2010). 
 60 Matthew Herder et al., Against Vaccine Assay Secrecy, 11 HUMAN VACCINES & 
IMMUNOTHERAPEUTICS 498, 498–503 (2015); see also Aaron Fellmeth, Secrecy, Monopoly, 
and Access to Pharmaceuticals in International Trade Law: Protection of Marketing Approval 
Data under the TRIPS Agreement, 45 HARV. INT’L L. J. 443, 443-503 (2004). 
 61 Janice Graham et al., Capacity for a Global Vaccine Safety System: The Perspective of 
National Regulatory Authorities, 30 VACCINE 4953, 4953–59 (2012). 
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Information] Portal. With the Interim Order’s introduction of a 
new expedited “rolling application” process it is unclear how 
much data Health Canada will have to release at the time of mar-
ket authorization.62 
In addition to relying on less data, governments also shared with the public 
insufficient amounts of information with the public about both the regulatory 
process and decision-making, and the details of the vaccine candidates. While 
sharing less information might theoretically limit fears relating to potential 
AEFIs, the current process: 
echoes government-driven vaccine races from the past, such as 
the one developed for the forecasted 1976 influenza pandemic, 
the side effects of which helped to propel anti-vaccination move-
ments to this very day. A COVID-19 intervention that is admin-
istered to whole swaths of the world’s population—without full 
transparency about its safety and efficacy—may engender lasting 
distrust not only against COVID-19 vaccines but a range of other 
infectious disease interventions with more established safety and 
efficacy profiles. The best way to prevent that outcome is to en-
sure high quality clinical trials, independent scrutiny of the result-
ing findings, and an unprecedented level of regulatory candour 
about experimental COVID-19 interventions in real-time. En-
hanced transparency should be a marker of the intervention’s 
trustworthiness—an expression of the regulatory system’s effort 
to convey what is known, to open that knowledge and judgment 
up to outsiders, and to invite critical reflection about whether a 
particular drug or vaccine will help us to re-emerge from COVID-
19.63 
Though the Minister has discretion with respect to releasing certain types of 
data under certain conditions to certain parties,64 previous Ministers have proven 
reluctant to share data, particularly if there was a concern that it could be classi-
fied as confidential business information.65 Again, this reflects the culture of non-
disclosure that exists in this stage of the vaccine development and safety ecosys-
tem. 
 
 62 Edmonds et al., supra note 41, at 19. 
 63 Id. at 28. 
 64 See Food & Drugs Act, R.S.C. 1985, c 3.3, 21.2(3)(a) (Can.). 
 65 Cf. Regulatory Transparency and Openness Framework and Action Plan 2015-2018, 
GOV’T CANADA, https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/corporate/transparency/regulatory-
transparency-and-openness/regulatory-transparency-openness-framework-action-plan-2015-
2018.html (last modified June 23, 2015). 
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The realities of the COVID-19 pandemic combined with the compressed na-
ture of COVID-19 vaccine development has made Health Canada’s historical 
‘closed shop’ approach more susceptible to distrust from the public. In an ap-
proval process that is sensitive to transparency—whether the development and 
approval process is normal or accelerated and compressed—Health Canada 
would make information such as trial design, raw safety and efficacy data, out-
come measures, researcher and regulator correspondence, and patient-level data 
(i.e., blinding and randomization protocols, serious adverse events within trials, 
etc.) available in real-time, or at least a timely fashion. Under current practices, 
they are often released late, and in some cases not at all, which seriously hampers 
the capacity of third-parties to re-analyze trials or to effectively assess the data 
on which regulatory decisions have been made.66 In the past, such re-analyses 
have revealed discrepancies between reported findings and actual trial results.67 
Quite simply, far too much remains non-transparent with the consequence that 
questions arise as to who actually benefits. Trust in the system, which is already 
criticized as being too cozy as between the regulators and the for-profit regu-
latees, who wield too much power, is undermined, and vaccine acceptance is 
reduced. 
 
IV. THE CLINICAL SURVEILLANCE STAGE: AN ABSENCE OF 
STANDARDS FOR AEFIS 
 
In this section, we turn to another stage in the vaccine development and safety 
ecosystem, namely that of clinical surveillance. Public tolerance of safety short-
falls in vaccines is significantly lower than that related to medicines administered 
to persons who are already sick because, where most pharmaceutical products 
are administered to ill persons for curative purposes, vaccines are usually given 
to healthy persons for preventative purposes.68 This lower risk tolerance trans-
lates into a need for an obviously robust and joined-up governance ecosystem 
that is sensitive to safety from development to deployment. While the above dis-
cussion suggests that the existing ecosystem does exhibit concern for safety, this 
concern is not realized through effective mechanisms in the clinical surveillance 
stage. 
As indicated, the pre-clinical stages of the ecosystem are unable to furnish 
complete safety profiles for vaccine candidates. The real-world safety and effec-
tiveness of vaccines can therefore only be known following widespread use and 
 
 66 Edmonds et al., supra note 41. 
 67 Johanna Le Noury et al., Restoring Study 329: Efficacy and Harms of Paroxetine and 
Imipramine in Treatment of Major Depression in Adolescence, 351 BMJ h4320 (2015). 
 68 Vaccine Safety Basics Learning Manual, supra note 34, at 14. 
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epidemiological tracking for AEFIs. In the case of COVID-19 vaccines, safety 
and effectiveness will likely vary from one vaccine to another, by age group, by 
medical condition, and potentially by geographic diversity69 and temporal re-
moteness from immunization, making the systematic collection of reliable data 
at this stage doubly important. Ideally, such data would be available to national 
authorities like Canada’s NACI in real-time so it can determine which vaccines 
are the most effective for different populations and fine-tune its COVID-19 rec-
ommendations in a vaccine-specific manner. In short, there is a pressing need to 
consistently and reliably (1) identify serious AEFIs, (2) report serious AEFIs, (3) 
assess serious AEFIs, and (4) support individuals who experience serious AEFIs 
causally connected to the vaccine or vaccine administering system. 
However, as a result of design deficiencies in the Canadian regulatory frame-
work, there exists a barrier to effective practice in the first step: identifying seri-
ous AEFIs. There is no contained standard or even harmonized understanding of 
this core concept; there is no single, sufficiently specific and compelling defini-
tion of an AEFI. Every province and territory in Canada has a public health pro-
motion statute of some kind, and all of them address immunization to some de-
gree. However, seven Canadian jurisdictions simply do not legislatively define 
what constitutes a reportable AEFI (e.g., Newfoundland & Labrador (NL), Nova 
Scotia (NS), New Brunswick (NB), Prince Edward Island (PEI), Saskatchewan 
(SK), North West Territories (NWT), Yukon (YK)).70 Both Quebec (QC) and 
 
 69 The interim analysis of Johnson & Johnson’s COVID-19 vaccine Phase III trial, re-
leased January 29, 2021, showed 72% efficacy in the United States but just 57% in South 
Africa. Jansen Investigational CPVID-19 Vaccine: Interim Analysis of Phase 3 Clinical Data 
Released, NAT’L INST. HEALTH (Jan. 29, 2021), https://www.jnj.com/johnson-johnson-an-
nounces-single-shot-janssen-covid-19-vaccine-candidate-met-primary-endpoints-in-interim-
analysis-of-its-phase-3-ensemble-trial. 
 70 Some of these jurisdictions may offer a non-legal definition at the policy or guidance 
level. For example, the Nova Scotia Immunization Manual stipulates that serious AEFIs should 
be reported by healthcare professionals, offering reasons why this is so, and how it should be 
done. It does not clearly articulate a definition for AEFIs, but states that, an “Adverse Event 
Following Immunization” should be reported when the event: 
• Has a temporal association with a vaccine: Please refer to the Summary of Reporting 
Criteria. Temporal association alone (i.e. onset of an event following receipt of vaccine) 
is not proof of causation. 
• Has no other clear cause at the time of reporting: A causal relationship between immun-
ization and the event that follows does not need to be proven and submitting a report 
does not imply or establish causality. Sometimes the vaccinee’s medical history, recent 
disease, concurrent illness/condition and/or concomitant medication(s) can explain the 
event(s). 
• Is serious in nature: A serious adverse event is one that is life threatening or results in 
death, requires hospitalization (≥24 hours) or prolongation of an existing hospitaliza-
tion, results in residual disability or associated with a congenital malformation. 
• Is unusual or unexpected: An event that has either not been identified previously or one 
that has been identified previously but is being reported at an increased frequency. For 
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Nunavut (NU) have definitions, but they are vague, imprecise, seemingly over-
broad, or otherwise provide little practical guidance for AEFI reporting. Those 
with a precise or relatively clear definition of what constitutes a reportable 
AEFI—Ontario (ON), Manitoba (MB), Alberta (AB), British Columbia (BC)—
all conflict to varying degrees as to what constitutes a reportable AEFI. For the 
legislative definitions in operation, see Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
Legal Definitions of AEFIs 
P/T Statute Definition 
NL Public Health Protection and Promo-
tion Act, SNL 2018, c. P-37.3 
No Definition Found 
NS Health Protection Act, SNS 2004, c. 4 No Definition Found 
PEI Public Health Act, RSPEI 1988, c. P-
30.1 
No Definition Found 
NB Public Health Act, SNB 1998, c. P-
22.4 
No Definition Found 
QC Public Health Act, c. s-2.2 s 69 [a]n unusual clinical manifestation, tem-
porally associated with vaccination, in a per-
son having received a vaccine or a contact of 
that person and [where the physician] suspects 
a link between the vaccine and the unusual 
clinical manifestation. 
ON Health Protection and Promotion Act, 
RSO 1990, c. H.7 
s 38(1) “reportable event” means, (a)  persis-
tent crying or screaming, anaphylaxis or ana-
phylactic shock occurring within forty-eight 
hours after the administration of an immuniz-
ing agent, (b)  shock-like collapse, high fever 
or convulsions occurring within three days af-
ter the administration of an immunizing agent, 
(c)  arthritis occurring within forty-two days 
after the administration of an immunizing 
agent, (d) generalized urticaria, residual 
 
additional information regarding unusual or unexpected events, please refer to the Ca-
nadian Immunization Guide. 
• Clusters of events: known or new events that occur in a geographic or temporal cluster 
(e.g. 6 in a week, or 6 in a zone) that require further assessment, even if the total number 
of AEFIs may not be higher than expected. 
It goes on to state that most vaccines reactions are mild and self-limited and local (e.g., ten-
derness or redness at injection site) or systemic (e.g., fever, joint or muscle pain) but are minor 
in severity, and those outlined in the vaccine product monograph do not need to be reported. 
PROVINCE OF N.S., NOVA SCOTIA IMMUNIZATION MANUAL 87 (2019), https://novasco-
tia.ca/dhw/cdpc/documents/Immunization-Manual.pdf. 
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seizure disorder, encephalopathy, encephalitis 
or any other significant occurrence occurring 
within fifteen days after the administration of 
an immunizing agent, or (e) death occurring at 
any time and following upon a symptom de-
scribed in clause (a), (b), (c) or (d). 
MB Immunization Regulations, M Reg. 
36/2009, adopted under the Public 
Health Act, CCSM c. P210 
s 2(1) For the purposes of the definition “re-
portable event” in s 56 of the Act, a reportable 
event means an adverse event set out in sub-
section (2) that is temporally associated with 
an immunizing agent, cannot be attributed to 
a co-existing condition, and that meets at least 
one of the following criteria: 
(a) the event is life-threatening, could result in 
permanent disability, requires hospitalization 
or urgent medical attention, or for any other 
reason is considered to be of a serious nature; 
(b) the event is unusual or unexpected, includ-
ing, without limitation, (i) an event that has 
not been previously identified, or (ii) an event 
that has been previously identified but is being 
reported at an increased frequency; 
(c) at the time of the report there is nothing in 
the patient’s medical history—such as a recent 
disease or illness, or the taking of medica-
tion—that could explain the event. 
s 2(2) The following are ‘adverse events’ for 
the purpose of subsection (1): 
(a) a local reaction at or near the injection site; 
(b) anaphylaxis; 
(c) an allergic reaction of any of the following 
types: (i) skin or mucosal, either at or near the 
injection site or generalized, (ii) cardiovascu-
lar, (iii) respiratory, (iv) gastrointestinal; 
(d) one or more of the following: (i) seizures, 
(ii) meningitis*, (iii) Guillain-Barré Syn-
drome*, (iv) Bell’s Palsy*, (v) paralysis other 
than Bell’s Palsy*, (vi) encephalopathy* or 
encephalitis*, (vii) hypotonic or hyporespon-
sive episode (age less than two years), (viii) 
persistent crying (continuous and unaltered 
for more than three hours), (ix) rash, (x) arthri-
tis, (xi) intussusception*, (xii) 
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thrombocytopenia*, (xiii) parotitis, (xiv) oc-
ulo-respiratory syndrome; 
* as diagnosed by a physician 
(e) a serious event not described in clauses (a) 
to (d).  
SK Public Health Act, SSK 1994, c. P-
37.1 
No Definition Found 
AB Immunization Regulation, AB Reg. 
182/2018, adopted under the Public 
Health Act, RSA 2000, c. P-37 
s 1(2) For the purposes of this Regulation and 
s 18.4 of the Act, “adverse event following im-
munization” means an unfavourable health 
occurrence experienced by a patient that (a) 
follows immunization, (b) cannot be at-
tributed to a pre-existing condition, and (c) 
meets one or more of the following criteria, as 
determined by a health practitioner: 
(i) the health occurrence is life-threatening, 
could result in permanent disability, requires 
hospitalization or urgent medical attention, or 
for any other reason is considered to be of a 
serious nature; 
(ii) the health occurrence is unusual or unex-
pected, including, without limitation, an oc-
currence that (A) has not previously been 
identified, or (B) has previously been identi-
fied but is being reported at increased fre-
quency; 
(iii) the health occurrence cannot be explained 
by anything in the patient’s medical history, 
including, without limitation, a recent disease 
or illness, or consumption of medication. 
BC Reporting Information Affecting Pub-
lic Health Regulation, BC Reg. 
167/2018, adopted under the Public 
Health Act, SBC 2008, c. 28 
s 5(1) “adverse event following immuniza-
tion” means a negative change in a person’s 
health that (a) occurs after the person receives 
an immunization, (b) is serious, unusual or un-
expected, or for which medical attention is 
sought, and (c) cannot clearly be attributed to 
a cause other than the immunization. 
NU Reporting and Disease Control Regu-
lations, NU Reg 051-2019, adopted 
under the Public Health Act, SNu 
2016, c. 13 
s 1 “adverse event following immunization” 
means an adverse medical event which has a 
temporal association, but not necessarily a 
causal association, with the administration of 
an immunizing agent and which cannot be 
clearly attributed to other causes. 
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NWT Public Health Act, SNWT 2007, c. 17 No Definition Found 
YK Public Health and Safety Act, RSY 
2002, c. 176 
No Definition Found 
 
This patchwork of definitions poses challenges for effective clinical surveil-
lance. A jurisdiction with a broader definition of an AEFI would likely report 
higher AEFI rates than provinces with a narrower definition. Those provinces 
with no legal definition would rely on healthcare providers to articulate and act 
upon their own definition. Thus, even if there is no real difference in the safety 
profile of a vaccine from one jurisdiction to another, the opposite may appear to 
be the case based on reported AEFIs. In addition to obscuring actual jurisdic-
tional differences in vaccine safety, this reality could undermine a national un-
derstanding of the real-world safety and efficacy of a vaccine, and it could frus-
trate reliable comparisons with other countries. It could also negatively and 
inappropriately skew public perceptions of vaccine safety. A common and clear 
Canada-wide definition which aligns with an international standard would allow 
for meaningful comparisons between AEFI rates in different sub-national juris-
dictions and internationally, and it would allow for more accurate and easily ag-
gregated data across jurisdictions to detect safety signals.71 
The second element of a clinical surveillance system is to ensure consistent 
and timely reporting of AEFIs to health authorities. The Canadian vaccine de-
velopment and safety ecosystem contains several clinical surveillance systems, 
being the following: 
 
• Canadian Adverse Events Following Immunization Surveillance Sys-
tem (CAEFISS): Managed by the Public Health Agency of Canada 
(PHAC), CAEFISS is a federal, provincial, territorial collaboration 
commencing in 1987 the objectives of which are to: (1) continuously 
monitor the safety of marketed vaccines in Canada; (2) identify in-
creases in the frequency or severity of recognized AEFIs; (3) identify 
previously unknown AEFIs that may be related to a vaccine; (4) iden-
tify areas that require further investigation or research; and (5) pro-
vide timely information for analysts and policy-makers on AEFI pro-
files for vaccines in Canada.72 CAEFISS receives reports from 
physicians, nurses, or pharmacists who provide immunizations, or 
 
 71 See Vaccine Safety Basics Module 3: Adverse Events Following Immunization, Classi-
fication of AEFIs, WORLD HEALTH ORG. [WHO], https://vaccine-safety-training.org/classifi-
cation-of-aefis.html (last visited March 8, 2021). 
 72 Canadian Adverse Events Following Immunization Surveillance System (CAEFISS), 
GOV’T CANADA,  https://www.canada.ca/en/public-health/services/immunization/canadian-
adverse-events-following-immunization-surveillance-system-caefiss.html (last visited Mar. 8, 
2021). 
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who care for individuals with AEFIs. The causal assessment is usu-
ally undertaken by the reporting healthcare provider, and the system 
is passive insofar as it relies on individuals to identify an issue and 
engage with the system.73 
• Immunization Monitoring Program ACTive (IMPACT): Overseen by 
the Canadian Paediatric Society and funded by PHAC, IMPACT is a 
more active system that feeds into CAEFISS. Nurse monitors in 
twelve paediatric hospitals across Canada (which handle some 90% 
of all paediatric tertiary care admissions) systematically search their 
admissions records for vaccine-preventable diseases and selected in-
fectious diseases in children that are (or will soon be) vaccine-pre-
ventable, vaccine failures, or AEFIs.74 When select medical events 
are found to be temporally linked to immunization, they are reported 
to CAEFISS, as well as to local and provincial and territorial health 
officials. Provided there is sufficient information on which to make a 
determination, PHAC undertakes a causality assessment using inter-
national practices and principles.75 
• Canada Vigilance Program (CVP): This is an infrastructure organiza-
tion and platform which passively receives and then assesses reports 
from health professionals and consumers about suspected adverse re-
actions to health products marketed in Canada, including prescription 
and non-prescription medications, natural health products, biologics 
(including vaccines), radiopharmaceuticals, and disinfectants and 
sanitizers. While the CVP provides a variety of tools for health pro-
fessionals and consumers to report suspected adverse reactions, re-
porting is voluntary.76 
• MedEffect: Under the Therapeutic Access Strategy (TAS), the Mar-
keted Health Products Directorate developed the MedEffect website, 
which is meant to: (1) simplify completion and filing of adverse re-
action reports via web, phone, fax, or mail; (2) build awareness about 
the importance of reporting adverse reactions, and how this 
 
 73 Id. 
 74 IMPACT, CANADIAN PAEDIATRIC SOCIETY, https://www.cps.ca/en/impact (last updated 
Nov. 10, 2020). 
 75 Causality Assessment of an Adverse Event Following Immunization (AEFI): User Man-
ual for the Revised WHO Classification, WORLD HEALTH ORG. [WHO] (2d ed. 2018), 
https://www.who.int/vaccine_safety/publications/aefi_manual.pdf?ua=1. 
 76 Canada Vigilance Program, GOV’T CANADA, https://www.canada.ca/en/health-can-
ada/services/drugs-health-products/medeffect-canada/canada-vigilance-program.html#wb-
cont (last modified July 12, 2018). See also HEALTH CANADA, REPORTING ADVERSE 
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information is used to identify and communicate potential risks; and 
(3) provide centralized public access to health product safety infor-
mation (e.g., Health Canada’s Advisories, Warnings, and Recalls, the 
Canadian Adverse Reaction Newsletter (CARN), and the Canadian 
Adverse Drug Reaction Monitoring Program (CADRMP)).77 
• Canadian Immunization Research Network (CIRN): To help manage 
affairs when an AEFI is discovered, and to help overcome concomi-
tant reluctance on the part of patients, parents, and healthcare work-
ers, the CIRN established thirteen special immunization clinics 
(SICs) staffed by paediatric and adult infectious disease specialists 
and allergists experienced in dealing with challenging situations (i.e., 
high-risk patients, etc.), which cases are logged into a central registry 
to enable review of further immunization outcomes for people with 
similar AEFIs, as well as to better evaluate management protocols.78 
 
Unfortunately, these systems do not coalesce into a comprehensive or harmo-
nized framework for the systematic reporting and collection of immune-relevant 
data, including that around AEFIs; they are mostly voluntary, they do not capture 
all of the places and avenues where AEFIs might be discovered and relevant data 
collected, and those sources that are captured are not integrated.79 Contrary to 
these largely passive (or voluntary, report-driven) mechanisms, the regulatory 
framework, in a breathtaking disjunct, imposes—albeit unevenly—mandatory 
AEFI reporting. 
The Regulations Amending the Food and Drug Regulations (Serious Adverse 
Drug Reaction Reporting—Hospitals),80 which came into effect in December 
2019, give effect to s 21.8 FDA. Under Regulation C.01.020.1(1), only hospitals 
are “prescribed health care institutions” obligated to provide to the Minister 
 
 77 MedEffect Canada, GOV’T CANADA, https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/ser-
vices/drugs-health-products/medeffect-canada.html (last modified Mar. 5, 2021). 
 78 Karina Top et al., Canadian Paediatricians’ Approaches to Managing Patients with 
Adverse Events Following Immunization: The Role of the Special Immunization Clinic Net-
work, 19 PAEDIATR CHILD HEALTH 310–14 (2014). 
 79 Nor are they linked to a fully integrated patient-centered health information system de-
signed to facilitate the determination of background rates and other relevant factors. Pano-
rama—the Provincial Public Health Information System Panorama, an electronic health record 
system that stores and allows authorized providers access to public health services received in 
the province—was supposed to deliver this data accessibility, but after some twenty years of 
evolution it remains only partially useful because it does not capture all the health data relevant 
for making sound assessments and decisions. For more, see An Audit of the Panorama Public 
Health System, AUDITOR GEN. BRITISH COLUMBIA (Aug. 2015), https://www.bcaudi-
tor.com/sites/default/files/publications/reports/OAGBC_PanoramaReport_FINAL.pdf. 
 80 SOR/2019-190 (Can.). 
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information that is in their control about a “serious adverse drug reaction.”81 Reg-
ulation C.01.020.1(2) identifies the ‘prescribed information’ that hospitals must 
provide to the Minister within 30 days. However, because surveillance is limited 
to hospitals, the Regulation neglects significant sources and avenues of infor-
mation, such as that arising from physicians, nurses, or nurse practitioners work-
ing in family or general practices, in clinics, or in congregate living facilities, as 
well as information that may be held by health authorities, and their data are not 
being systematically collected, aggregated, or assessed. Even with respect to hos-
pitals, Regulation C.01.020.1(3) FDR states that a hospital is exempt from s 21.8 
FDA with respect to reporting this information if, inter alia, the information re-
lates to a vaccine that was administered under a routine immunization program 
of a province. 
Given the above, one must turn to the provinces and territories for further 
guidance on reporting. Eleven of Canada’s thirteen sub-national jurisdictions im-
pose mandates; Newfoundland & Labrador and Yukon are without mandatory 
AEFI reporting. In all cases where mandates exist, there are potentially signifi-
cant penalties for failure to report, which suggests that, as a policy matter, gov-
ernments recognize that tracking AEFIs is important. Ontario goes farthest re-
garding mandates and penalties, stipulating that the healthcare provider 
administering a vaccine must inform the patient of the importance of immedi-
ately seeking healthcare should an AEFI occur.82 
 
Table 2 
Mandatory AEFI Reporting & Penalties 
P/T Statutory and Regulatory Provisions Man-
date 
Penalty 
NL NA No  
NS Health Protection Act, SNS 2004, c. 4, ss 31(1), 71(1); Yes Fine: $2,000 
Prison: 6 months 
 
 81 C.R.C., c. 870 C.01.020.1(1). Under Regulation C.01.020.1(4), the term “hospital” 
means 
a facility (a) that is licensed, approved or designated as a hospital by a prov-
ince in accordance with the laws of the province to provide care or treatment 
to persons suffering from any form of disease or illness; or (b) that is oper-
ated by the Government of Canada and that provides health services to in-
patients. 
 82 Province of Ontario Health Protection and Promotion Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.7, s 38(2). 
It is not clear what effect, if any, this interaction has on patients (i.e., whether it causes patients 
to seek medical attention more quickly, or whether it causes anxiety and unnecessary 
healthcare visits); see also infra 18 tbl. 2 (providing the penalty for non-compliance with man-
datory AEFI reporting). 
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Reporting of Notifiable Diseases and Conditions Regula-
tions, NS Reg 195/2005, s 11(1). 
PEI Public Health Act, RSPEI 1988, c. P-30.1, s 66(1); 
Immunization Regulations to the Public Health Act, s 4. 
Yes Fine: $1,000 
($10,000 for 3+ 
offences) 
Prison: 6 months 
NB Public Health Act, SNB 1998, c. P-22.4, ss 27(1)(c) and 
52(1); 
Reporting and Diseases Regulations, s 18; Provincial Of-
fences Procedure Act, s 56(3). 
Yes Fine: $1,100 




QC Public Health Act, c. s-2.2, ss 69 and 138. Yes Fine: $1,200 
ON Health Protection and Promotion Act, RSO 1990, c. H.7, 
ss 38 and 100(2). 
Yes Fine: $5,000 
MB Public Health Act, CCSM c. P210, ss 59 and 90. Yes Fine: $50,000 
Prison: 6 months 
SK Public Health Act, SSK 1994, c. P-37.1, ss 23(1) and 61. Yes Fine: $75,000 
($100,000 for 2+ 
offences) 
AB Public Health Act, RSA 2000, c. P-37, ss 5(1) and 73(3). Yes Fine: $100,000 
($500,000 for 2+ 
offences) 
BC Public Health Act, SBC 2008, c. 28, ss 12 and 99(1)(d); 
Reporting Information Affecting Public Health Regula-
tion, BC Reg 167/2018, s 5. 
Yes Fine: $25,000 
Prison: 6 months 
NU Public Health Act, SNu 2016, c. 13, ss 12 and 80(1); 
Reporting and Disease Control Regulations, NU Reg 
051-2019, s 2(2)(b). 
Yes Fine: $50,000 
($100,000 for 2+ 
offences) 
Prison: One year 
NWT Public Health Act, SNWT 2007, c. 17, ss 3(2) and 
49(1)(a). 
Yes Fine: $10,000 
($25,000 for 2+ 
offences) 
Prison: 6 months 
(1 year for 2+ of-
fences) 
YK  No  
 
However, it is questionable the extent to which these mandates are enforced. 
There is no information available on enforcement, but the authors’ practical 
knowledge of, and engagement with, this field, combined with a legal search of 
reported cases, suggests a general absence of attention to mandate enforcement 
and imposition of statutory penalties. Ultimately, there are no strong motivators 
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for healthcare providers to vigilantly report AEFIs (assuming they can determine 
that the condition they are seeing is following or associated with a vaccination). 
On this point, the Canadian Medical Protective Association has noted that ad-
verse events reporting across Canada remains uneven, in part due to non-harmo-
nized legal obligations, and it recommends a consistent approach to reporting.83 
Standardized reporting protocols combined with reporting to a central (national) 
database would permit factual information to be gathered and would support sys-
tem-wide data collection and analysis, including meta-analysis of incident and 
occurrence trends. 
We recommend that Canada (and other countries) adopt mandatory reporting 
of serious AEFIs, imposing reporting obligations on all healthcare professionals 
who administer vaccines or are expected to treat patients post-immunization. In 
short, mandates need to exist on those who perform healthcare duties in hospital-
based, clinic-based, and congregated care-based contexts, which includes indi-
viduals such as physicians, family physicians, public health nurses, nurse practi-
tioners, and pharmacists. Obviously, this reporting must be imposed not only on 
and through hospitals, but also on individual healthcare providers in a range of 
care settings, and on health authorities. 
The third element in a clinical surveillance system is to ensure consistent, re-
liable, and timely assessment of serious AEFIs. Given the relatively low levels 
of attention paid to public health and preventative medicine both generally and 
in healthcare training (and specifically in medical schools), it is unclear the ex-
tent to which healthcare providers are uniformly equipped to consistently iden-
tify, much less reliably assess, AEFIs. Many healthcare providers who adminis-
ter vaccinations (e.g., nurses and pharmacists), and many who may see patients 
for health-related events post-vaccination (e.g., family physicians), will not have 
the training or experience to confidently assess whether an event is causally re-
lated to vaccination. 
Further, both these healthcare providers and more suitable assessors will be 
further stymied by the fact that there exists no single repository for storing im-
munization status or AEFI data. Data that will be important to collect from pa-
tients experiencing a medically significant event include: their demographic in-
formation (i.e., age, sex, ethnicity, location, etc.); their immunization history and 
status; their general health condition, including medications and allergies; the 
 
 83 CMPA, Medical-Legal Handbook for Physicians in Canada, Version 8.3 (2020), 
https://www.cmpa-acpm.ca/en/advice-publications/handbooks/medical-legal-handbook-for-
physicians-in-canada#harm-from-healthcare-delivery. For more on the inadequacy of post-
market surveillance regulation, see Joel Lexchin, Health Canada’s Use of its Notice of Com-
pliance with Conditions Drug Approval Policy: A Retrospective Cohort Analysis, 49 INT’L J. 
HEALTH SERVS. 294–305 (2019). For a critic of the U.S. system, see Joshua D. Wallach et al., 
Postmarket Studies Required by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration for New Drugs and 
Biologics Approved Between 2009 and 2012: Cross Sectional Analysis, BRIT. MED. J. 1 (Apr. 
16, 2018). 
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existence of any previous adverse reactions to vaccination; whether a COVID-
19 vaccine was received, and which one; when and where the vaccine was re-
ceived, and how was it delivered; and how the vaccine was tolerated at the time 
of inoculation. 
However, as noted, Canada relies on multiple-discontinuous-electronic per-
sonal health information (PHI) platforms, and there is no widely-shared access 
point for retrieving existing AEFI data in real time (i.e., there are few links be-
tween hospital data, community clinic office data, and immunization registry 
data such that reliable data can be aggregated in pursuit of reliable assessments). 
Without access to such data—very granular data easily accessed by assessors—
neither reliable vaccine safety (AEFI occurrence) determinations nor reliable 
vaccine effectiveness determinations can be made because they will rely on an 
incomplete or inaccurate evidentiary base considered by individuals not in a po-
sition to robustly assess the data. Under the present system, not all positive cases 
will be queried with respect to the multiple issues that are pertinent, including 
prior receipt of a COVID-19 vaccine (and then which vaccine, when and where 
it was received, how it was delivered and tolerated, etc.). Such details are partic-
ularly important for differentiation of effectiveness of one vaccine versus an-
other, and for answering such practically significant questions as: 
 
• Is the failure or event directly due to a storage and handling, diluent, 
or other program error, or is it more probably linked to an element or 
action of the specific vaccine? 
• Are failures or events being seen amongst others who received that 
specific vaccine during that time period? 
• Are there underlying clinical reasons that may have altered response 
to that specific vaccine? 
 
To properly evaluate these questions when a patient presents with a possible 
AEFI, the assessor requires access to significantly more data than is currently 
collected by the fragmented systems that exist. 
We recommend that each national jurisdiction should found a single, central, 
independent, and interdisciplinary body which is tasked with assessing for cau-
sation all reported serious AEFIs. Only through reliance on a single expert body 
can decision-makers be assured that a consistent analysis using common factors, 
like evidence and national standards, is being applied. This body could then clas-
sify post-immunization medical events as vaccine-related, program-related, or 
unrelated AEFIs. To do this effectively, there should also exist a ‘large linked 
database’ (LLDB).84 Although some countries have successfully implemented 
 
 84 Vaccine Safety Basics: Learning Manual, supra note 34, at 28. This Learning Manual 
notes that LLDBs are discrete administrative databases created independently from each other 
that are linked to enable the sharing of data across platforms. Id. With sufficient integration, 
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relatively low-cost, patient-centered, and integrated health information systems 
that can be searched in real-time,85 Canada has not done so. 
The final element of a comprehensive clinical surveillance system, and one 
that may additionally impact public trust and acceptance of vaccines, is support 
for those patients who have experienced a serious AEFI related to the program 
or the vaccine. Such support should come in the form of a Vaccine Injury Com-
pensation Program (VICP), which programs are not uncommon in the many 
high-income countries. As of 2011, the only G8 countries without a national 
VICP were Canada and Russia,86 and currently, twenty-four countries and the 
province of Quebec have such programs.87 VICPs are typically instituted based 
on a belief that governments have a special responsibility to those injured by 
properly manufactured and administered vaccines used in public health pro-
grams; they are increasingly seen as an important component of vaccination pro-
grams.88 They are particularly important given the abysmal success of tort claims 
relating to vaccine injuries.89 VICPs have produced positive experiences,90 with 
the existence of such programs contributing to:91 
 
they can detect very rare ARs and AEFIs, and can provide an economical and rapid means of 
conducting post-licensure studies of the safety of drugs and vaccines. Id. They can also facil-
itate the testing of hypotheses when signals or allegations create suspicions of a possible vac-
cine safety issue. Id. 
 85 Michael Graven et al., Decline in Mortality with the Belize Integrated Patient-Centred 
Country Wide Health Information System (BHIS) with Embedded Program Management, 82 
INT’L J. MED. INFORMATICS 954–63 (2013); see also Michael Krausz et al., Emergency Re-
sponse to COVID-19 in Canada: Platform Development and Implementation for eHealth in 
Crisis Management, 6 JMIR PUB. HEALTH & SURVEILLANCE e18995 (2020) (outlining the tri-
age, monitoring, and service-provision platform). 
 86 Roger Collier, No-Fault Compensation Program Overdue, Experts Say, 183 CANADIAN 
MED. ASS’N J.  E263 (2011), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3060206/. 
 87 Randy G. Mungwira et al., Global Landscape Analysis of No-Fault Compensation Pro-
grammes for Vaccine Injuries: A Review and Survey of Implementing Countries, 15 PLOS 
ONE 1, 4 (2020),  https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0233334. 
For more on the Quebec program, see Eve Dubé et al., Vaccine Injury Compensation Pro-
grams: Rationale and an Overview of the Québec Program, 46 CAN. COMMUNICABLE DISEASE 
REP. 305–08 (2020). 
 88 Geoffrey Evans, Vaccine Injury Compensation Programs Worldwide, 17 VACCINE S25–
S35 (1999). 
 89 For a now dated U.K. examination, see Stephanie Pywell, A Critical Review of the Re-
cent and Impending Changes to the Law of Statutory Compensation for Vaccine Damage, 246 
J. PERS. INJ. LITIG. ONLINE 4 (2000). The Canadian setting exhibits a similar trend. 
 90 See Ruth Tindley, A Critical Analysis of the Vaccine Damage Payments Scheme, 19 
EUR. BUS. L. REV. 321 (2008) (providing the U.K. experience with VICPs); see Laine Rutkow 
et al., Balancing Consumer and Industry Interests in Public Health: The National Vaccine 
Injury Compensation Program and its Influence During the Last Two Decades, 111 PENN ST. 
L. REV. 681 (2006) (examining the U.S. experience with VICPs); Katherine Cook & Geoffrey 
Evans, The National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 127 PEDIATRICS S74 (2011). 
 91 Kimberly M. Thompson et al., Performance of the United States Vaccine Injury Com-
pensation Program (VICP): 1988–2019, 38 VACCINE 1, 6 (2020); see also H. Cody Meissner, 
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• better evidence around vaccine safety; 
• better evidence around the nature of injuries relating to (specific) vac-
cines; and 
• greater confidence in vaccines. 
 
Ultimately, in addition to representing important supports for people who have 
been injured, such programs signal to the public that the government and health 
authorities are confident in the products being delivered. In this way, these pro-
grams are one of the many tools needed to combat vaccine hesitancy. 
All told, the prevailing vaccine surveillance system in Canada is neither de-
signed nor sufficiently powered to encourage justified trust in the vaccines ad-
ministered, even when they are in fact safe and effective. A significant barrier to 
a more robust, comprehensive, and harmonized system is the persistent insinua-
tion into framework development efforts of the many vested interests across Can-
ada and of provinces and territories. As an example, consider the 2003 National 
Immunization Strategy, a multi-million-dollar plan to align vaccination sched-
ules and expand access across Canada, which ultimately failed due to the juris-





Both market authorization and AEFI reporting are part of Canada’s vaccine 
development and safety ecosystem. However, they exhibit operational and de-
sign shortcomings which may well undermine public trust in the actors and sys-
tems, and public acceptance of the vaccines. 
With respect to the market authorization stage, while useful flexibilities exist 
to facilitate rapid development and authorization, the process for doing so is not 
at all transparent, veiling substantial amounts of data, and obscuring the assess-
ment process undertaken by regulators. To remedy this, the Minister should ex-
ercise the discretion granted under the FDA and FDR to expand Health Canada’s 
data-sharing practices in relation to vaccine approvals, and to move those ex-
panded sharing practices further upstream in the authorization process. Greater 
public trust cannot be achieved without transparent access to the raw data on 
which decisions to approve and recommend vaccines are based. 
 
et al., The National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program: Striking a Balance Between In-
dividual Rights and Community Benefit, 321 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 343, 344 (2019). 
 92 Wayne Kondro, Progress Report on the National Immunization Strategy, 176 
CANADIAN MED. ASS’N J. 1811–13 (2007). 
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With respect to the clinical surveillance stage, which is aimed at determining 
the real-world safety and effectiveness of vaccines, there is much that govern-
ments can do to improve identification, reporting, and assessment of AEFIs, and 
to better support patients who have been injured as a result of vaccines or actions 
taken within vaccine programs. In the Canadian context, preventative medicine 
must feature more prominently in healthcare provider education, AEFI reporting 
must be made mandatory in all Canadian jurisdictions and with respect to all 
pertinent actors, with robust enforcement of such mandates, and reporting and 
data systems must be strengthened (or implemented). Also, there should exist an 
independent national expert body (equivalent to the NACI) that is tasked with 
conducting causality assessments with respect to AEFIs. This would facilitate 
quality of the causality assessment by injecting consistency in the standards ap-
plied, the factors taken into account, and the specific biological actions of the 
subject vaccine. 
Ultimately, the fragmented approach that prevails in Canada in relation to key 
aspects of the vaccine development and safety ecosystem creates a sub-optimal 
immunization environment that will not encourage justified trust and high rates 
of vaccine acceptance. Long-term neglect of public health prior to the COVID-
19 pandemic has left systems under-resourced. The pandemic has simultaneously 
highlighted both the fragility and the indispensability of public health in this 
country and others. Strong action now—in advance of mass distribution of 
COVID-19 vaccines and their possible inclusion in routine immunization pro-
grams—will strengthen national public health systems and better prepare them 
for the next pandemic. 
 
